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Abstract—As recently emerged rowhammer exploits require
undocumented DRAM address mapping, we propose a generic
knowledge-assisted tool, DRAMDig, which takes domain knowl-
edge into consideration to efficiently and deterministically un-
cover the DRAM address mappings on any Intel-based ma-
chines. We test DRAMDig on a number of machines with
different combinations of DRAM chips and microarchitectures
ranging from Intel Sandy Bridge to Coffee Lake. Comparing to
previous works, DRAMDig deterministically reverse-engineered
DRAM address mappings on all the test machines with only
7.8 minutes on average. Based on the uncovered mappings, we
perform double-sided rowhammer tests and the results show
that DRAMDig induced significantly more bit flips than previous
works, justifying the correctness of the uncovered DRAM address
mappings.
Index Terms—Rowhammer, Reverse-engineer, DRAM Address
Mapping, Knowledge-assisted Tool.
I. INTRODUCTION
DRAM is the main memory unit of modern computer sys-
tems and organized into rows. In 2014, Kim et al. [6] reported
a software-induced DRAM fault, the so-called “rowhammer”,
that is, intensive accessing two DRAM rows can cause bit flips
in an adjacent row even without accessing the row. The fault
was soon after exploited in cross memory boundary such as
user-kernel [13] and VM-hypervisor [14]. To demonstrate a
rowhammer exploit successfully, understanding how physical
addresses are mapped to DRAM is a necessity [13], [10], [14]
to efficiently and effectively induce rowhammer bit flips.
Although such mapping is available in AMD’s architectural
manual but not published by another major chip company,
Intel. As shown in Table I, Seaborn et al. [13] was the first to
uncover the mapping. They first perform a blind rowhammer
test, results of which are used to analyze DRAM address
mapping of a specific machine. Although their methodology is
intuitive and simple, the blind test is quite inefficient (within
hours) and needs to be performed again if the machine setting
changes (e.g., its microarchitecture or DRAM chips are re-
placed). To address the efficiency issue, Xiao et al. [14] applied
a timing channel [9] to efficiently uncover DRAM address
mapping. However, their tool only works in a limited number
of machine settings (we actually experimented the code they
shared and details are in Section IV-A). DRAMA [10] was
the first to present a generic reverse-engineering tool that
can be used in any Intel machines. It proposes a brute-
force approach to enumerate all possible combinations of
physical address bits and verify each combination based on the
aforementioned timing channel. Due to its blind selection of
physical addresses, DRAMA is inefficient (within hours) and
often fails to output a deterministic DRAM address mapping
(we tested their code 1 and details are in Section IV).
Uncovering Tool Generic Efficient Deterministic
Seaborn et al. [13] × × (within hours) √
Xiao et al. [14] × √ (within minutes) √
DRAMA [10]
√ × (within hours) ×
DRAMDig
√ √
(within minutes)
√
TABLE I: A comparison of uncovering tools. DRAMDig is the
first generic and efficient tool to generate deterministic DRAM
address mappings. All other tools cannot achieve these three
properties at the same time.
Our contributions: In this paper, we revisit the limitations
and advantages of the aforementioned algorithms and observe
that none of them made full use of domain knowledge. With
this key observation, we propose a generic knowledge-assisted
tool, which utilizes domain knowledge (see Section III-A) to
produce a deterministic DRAM address mapping on differ-
ent machines. First, DRAMDig detects physical-address bits
that index rows and columns, respectively. Second, the tool
resolves the mappings from remaining bits to banks including
channels, DIMMs, and ranks. Third, DRAMDig determines the
bank bits that are also row bits or column bits.
We test DRAMDig on 9 different machine settings and
it is able to efficiently and deterministically uncover the
DRAM address mapping on each setting within only 7.8
minutes on average. Based on the uncovered mappings, we
perform double-sided rowhammer tests on three different
machine settings and all results show that DRAMDig is much
more effective in inducing rowhammer bit flips than the
other generic tool, DRAMA [10]. To this end, DRAMDig
enables users to test how vulnerable their computers are to
the rowhammer problem and also help evaluate the impact
of existing rowhammer attacks [14], [2], [10], [4], [1] and
rowhammer DRAM PUFs [11], [15].
1https://github.com/IAIK/drama
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In summary, we make the following key contributions:
• We present a generic knowledge-assisted tool to reverse-
engineer DRAM address mappings on both DDR3 and
DDR4 chips for different CPU microarchitectures.
• Compared to existing works, our proposed algorithm
makes full use of system DRAM information, which
makes itself efficient in generating a deterministic DRAM
address mapping.
• We perform rowhammer tests based on DRAMDig and
have induced a significantly higher number of bit flips
than previous works, justifying the correctness of our
uncovered DRAM address mappings.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we first describe the modern DRAM organi-
zation and then briefly introduce the rowhammer vulnerability.
A. Dynamic Random-Access Memory
Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) modules are
produced in the form of Dual Inline Memory Module (DIMM).
A DIMM is directly connected to the CPU’s memory con-
troller through one of two channels. A DIMM consists of one
or two ranks, corresponding to its one or two sides. Each rank
is further decomposed of multiple banks. A bank is structured
as arrays of cells with rows and columns. When a memory
access to a desired bank occurs, this “opens” a specified row
by transferring all data in the row to the bank’s row buffer
and a specified column from the row buffer will be accessed.
As such, subsequent access to the same row will be served by
the row buffer, while opening another row will flush the row
buffer.
DRAM Refresh: The charge in the DRAM cell is not
persistent and will drain over time due to various charge
leakage reasons [6]. To prevent data loss, a periodic re-
charge or refresh is required for all cells. DRAM specification
specifies that the DRAM refresh interval is typically 32 or 64
ms, during which all cells within a rank will be refreshed.
DRAM Address Mapping: The CPU’s memory controller
decides how physical-address bits are mapped to a DRAM
address. A DRAM address refers to a 3-tuple of bank, row,
column (DIMM, channel, and rank are included into the bank
tuple). As this mapping is not publicly documented on a major
processor platform, i.e., Intel, Seaborn et al. [12] observed
that only different rows within the same bank can induce
rowhammer bit flips. Based on this observation, they made
an educated guess on the DRAM address mapping of an Intel
Sandy Bridge CPU. Both DRAMA [10] and Xiao et al. [14]
relied on a timing channel [9] to uncover the mapping.
B. The Rowhammer Vulnerability
DRAM rows are vulnerable to persistent charge leakage
induced by adjacent rows. Specifically, frequently opening
(also known as rowhammer) one row within the DRAM
refresh interval can cause bit flips to the neighboring rows.
To trigger expected rowhammer bit flips from a modern
CPU, an adversary has to clear the CPU caches and the row
buffer, and gain the knowledge of how DRAM is accessed
by the CPU. Firstly, all-level CPU cache must be flushed
in order to hammer rows and this can be done explicitly
by an unprivileged instruction (e.g., clflush) on x86 or
implicitly by eviction sets of physical memory lines [1], [5],
[3]. Secondly, bypassing the row buffer is also a necessity.
Intuitively, hammering (i.e., frequently accessing) two differ-
ent rows within the same bank in an alternate manner can
bypass the row buffer. If two rows happen to be one row
apart, such technique is called double-sided rowhammer. If
not, then it is called single-sided rowhammer. Alternatively,
one-location rowhammer [4] forces the memory controller to
clear the row buffer and thus only needs to hammer one row.
Lastly, to map a virtual address to a DRAM address, Memory
Management Unit (MMU) will translate the virtual address to
a physical address, which is mapped to a DRAM address by
the memory controller. The virtual to physical mapping can be
addressed by either accessing pagemap or forcing hugepage
allocation. Clearly, a correct DRAM address mapping helps
induce more rowhammer bit flips and thus affects existing
rowhammer attacks [14], [2], [10], [4], [1] and rowhammer
DRAM PUFs [11] as well as its attack [15].
III. OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe a knowledge-assisted approach,
named DRAMDig, to reverse engineer DRAM address map-
pings. As shown in Figure 1, DRAMDig consists of three main
steps. In Step 1, we perform row and column bits detection and
produce a coarse-grained results; that is, most row and column
bits are uncovered while bits in grey boxes are still covered. In
Step 2, we carefully select physical addresses that only differ
in bits shown in grey boxes, then partition those addresses into
different piles (addresses in each pile share the same bank),
and identify bank address functions that can work for all piles.
In Step 3, we perform a fine-grained analysis on the resolved
bank address functions to detect row or column bits that also
play a role in the bank address functions as shared bits (see
lined boxes in Figure 1). Note that each step needs assistance
from specific domain knowledge.
In the following sections, we first introduce the domain
knowledge and a timing primitive, and then discuss the major
three steps of DRAMDig in details.
A. Domain Knowledge
We categorize the domain knowledge into three groups.
• Specifications. We refer to DDR3 and DDR4 specifica-
tions [7], [8] to acquire physical-address bit numbers that
index banks, rows and columns on specific DRAM chips.
• System Information. This includes the total number of
banks, physical memory size, and whether DRAM chips
support ECC protection. This information can be obtained
from the output of system commands such as decode-
dimms and dmidecode.
• Empirical observations. We have considered two aspects.
Firstly, a bank address function on Intel microarchitecture
is a tuple of multiple physical address bits, which are
 Row & Column Bit Detection
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 Bank Address Functions Resolving
 Row & Column Bit Detection
(Fine-grained)
Row Bits Bank Bits Column Bits
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Row Bits Bank Bits Column Bits
Row Bits Bank Bits Column Bits
Row Bits Bank Bits Column Bits
shared bits between Banks with either Rows or Columns
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Fig. 1: DRAMDig Workflow.
XORed to output a single bit. Secondly, since Ivy Bridge,
the lowest bit of a bank address function that owns the
most number of bits is not the column bit.
B. A Timing Primitive
We resort to a timing channel [9] to reverse-engineer the
DRAM mappings. Specifically, this timing channel is caused
by the row-buffer conflicts within the same DRAM bank. As
mentioned in Section II, each bank has a row buffer that caches
the last accessed row. If a pair of addresses reside in two
different rows of the bank and they are accessed alternately, the
row buffer will be repeatedly reloaded and cleared. This causes
the so-called row-buffer conflicts. Clearly, row buffer conflicts
can lead to higher latency in accessing the two addresses than
the case that they lie either within the same row or in different
banks. As such, we can distinguish whether two addresses are
in different rows within the same bank.
C. Row & Column Bit Detection (Coarse-Grained)
We firstly partition the physical address bits into row,
column and bank bits at a coarse-grained level. We use the
same approach as the work [14]. Specifically, for row bits,
we measure access latency for two physical addresses that
only with one bit different. If the latency is high, that means
those addresses reside within the same bank but different row
(SBDR), and that bit is the only different bit for the two
addresses, so it is a row bit.
For column bits, we select two physical addresses with only
two bits being different, one being any detected row bit and
the other being one non-row bit. If we get high latency for
those two addresses, the non-row bit is a column bit. This
because the two addresses are in the same bank, so neither of
those bits is a bank bit, and then that non-row bit is a column
bit that determine which column a physical address is mapped
to. Finally, We consider the bits left are bank bits.
Note that the bits detection results in this step are coarse-
grained. The row and column bits detected so far are only
responsible for addressing rows and columns. There could be
other row bits or column bits that also take responsibility for
addressing banks, and they are not detected in this step. We
will discuss how to identify them in section III-E.
D. Bank Address Function Resolving
We uncover the bank address functions based on the above
coarse-grained detection results. It consists of three phases.
First, we calculate a number of specific address ranges based
on the bank bits, and then select physical addresses within
those ranges. Second, we partition the selected addresses into
#bank number of piles, of which #bank can be known from
the System Information in Section III-A. At last, we investigate
those address piles and detect the bank address functions. We
discuss the three phases in detail as follows.
Physical-Address Selection: The main idea is to only select
the physical addresses within specific ranges. Such ranges
reflect all possible values of all bank bits, so the selected
addresses contain all the bank address functions. Besides,
as the number of bank bits is determined through coarse-
grained detection, the number of selected addresses can be
determined. Algorithm 1 presents how we conduct physical-
address selection.
Algorithm 1 Physical-Address Selection
Input: phys pages: allocated memory pages; B: possible bank bits;
Output: phys pool
1: b min, b max = find min max(B)
2: range mask = (1 << (b max+ 1))− (1<<b min)
3: miss mask = 0
4: for b ∈ [b min, b max] && b /∈ B do
5: miss mask+=(1 << b)
6: end for
7: for p ∈ phys pages do
8: if (p&range mask) == range mask then
9: P start = p− range mask
10: P end = p+ PAGE SIZE
11: if !page miss(phys pages, P start, P end) then
12: break
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: phys pool = {}
17: for p = P start; p < P end; p+ = (1 << b min) do
18: p′ = p | miss mask
19: if page(p′) ∈ phys pages then
20: phys pool.add(p′)
21: end if
22: end for
23: return phys pool
The algorithm first calculates a range mask, which in-
dicates bank bits positions, and selects the physical pages
that cover that range. (line 7-15). We don’t want miss any
bank bits and thus we require that the selected physical
pages are consecutive, and if there are some pages missed
in phys pages, we try again. The last found physical page
range is presented by [P start, P end].
Note that we use b min and b max to calculate range
mask, but not all the bits in [b min, b max] will be used in
the bank address functions. We use “miss mask” to represent
those bits that have nothing to do with the address functions
such that we set the bits to 1. Next, for every investigated
address p with [P start, P end], we make it first mask
against miss mask and then check whether the new address
p′ is valid and if so, we add it to phys pool, which holds
final selected addresses. With “miss mask”, it enables us to
only focus on the reasonable number of addresses that actually
matter the address functions.
Physical Addresses Partition: We apply Algorithm 2 to
partition the selected addresses into #bank numbers of piles.
First, we randomly select one address p from phys pool and
measure the latency with every other address. If the latency
is high, it means we have one address that is SBDR with p.
We put it into piles[p] which stores addresses from phys pool
that are SBDR with p (line 4-9). By doing so, we can collect
all addresses from phys pool that are SBDR with p and
record them in piles[p]. Next we verify whether the number
of addresses in piles[p] is within a valid range. If so, we
consider this round of partition is successful, and then remove
all the addresses in piles[p] from phys pool and conduct next
round of partition (line 10-12). Finally, it stops when enough
addresses have been partitioned (line 13-15).
Algorithm 2 Physical-Address Partition
Input: : phys pool: selected physical addresses
Output: : piles: a map < k, v >, of which k is an address and v
is the addresses that are SBDR with k.
1: pool sz = phys pool.size()
2: pile sz = pool sz/#bank
3: while True do
4: randomly select p from phys pool
5: for p′ ∈ phys pool − {p} do
6: if latency(p, p′) == high then
7: piles[p].add(p′)
8: end if
9: end for
10: if 1− δ ≤ piles[p].size()/pile sz ≤ 1 + δ then
11: phys pool = phys pool − {piles[p]} − {p}
12: end if
13: if phys pool.size() > per threshold ∗ pool sz then
14: break
15: end if
16: end while
17: return piles
Ideally, all the addresses in phys pool will be partitioned
into #bank number of piles with each pile having the same
number of addresses. However, in practice the partition may
be influenced by noises introduced by incorrect results of
latency measurement, so it is possible that not all of piles
have the same number of addresses, and also there may be
some addresses that not partitioned into any pile. That’s why
we introduce δ and per threshold and they can be adjusted
in practice. Empirically, we set δ to 0.2 and per threshold
to 85% and then the addresses can be successfully partitioned
into #bank number of piles.
Bank Address Function Detection: We utilize Algorithm 3
to present how to detect bank address functions based on the
address piles obtained.
Algorithm 3 Bank Address Function Detection.
Input: : piles: a map < k, v >, of which k is an address and v is
the addresses that have SBDR with k; B: bank bits
Output: : bank funcs: the set that stores bank address functions
1: xor masks = gen xor masks(B)
2: bank funcs = {}
3: for pile ∈ piles do
4: func set = {}
5: for mask ∈ xor masks do
6: if apply xor mask to pile(mask, pile) then
7: func set.insert(mask)
8: end if
9: end for
10: bank funcs = bank funcs ∩ func set
11: end for
12: prioritize(bank funcs)
13: remove redundant(bank funcs)
14: check numbering(bank funcs, piles)
15: return bank funcs
According to Empirical Observation in Section III-A, bank
address functions take some bank bits as input and output
XORed values from those bank bits. Since we have grouped
#bank number of piles and the addresses in each pile map to
the same bank, we look into each pile and try all combinations
of bank bits and apply each of them to the addresses in the
pile. We look into the combination starting from one bit to
the number of bank bits (line 1). If a combination of bank
bits has the same XORed result for all the addresses in the
pile, we consider it as a possible bank address function. After
investigating all the piles, we can have all possible bank
address functions (line 3-11).
However, some address functions are just linear combina-
tions of the others so they are not the actual address functions
and need to be removed. We consider the functions that have
fewer bits have higher priority and remove the lower one
if it is the linear combinations of higher priority functions.
For instance, if (14, 18), (15, 19) and (14, 15, 18, 19)
are 3 bank address functions. We consider the previous two
have higher priority than the third, because the third is the
linear combination of the previous two and we consider it as
redundant (line 12-13).
Apart from that, the number of bank address functions
should be log2(#bank). There may be more than that number
of functions after removing the redundant, and they are not
actual address functions. So we test every combination of
log2(#bank) number of functions and consider them as bank
address functions, and use them to number the address piles.
The actual bank address functions should be able to count
those piles from 0 to #bank − 1 (line 14).
Machine Microarch. DRAM Bank Address Functions Row Bits Column Bits
No. Type, Size Config.
No.1
Sandy Bridge
DDR3, 8GiB 2, 1, 1, 8 (6), (14, 17), (15, 18), (16, 19) 17∼32 0∼5, 7∼13
i5-2400
No.2
Ivy Bridge
DDR3, 8GiB 2, 1, 2, 8 (14, 18), (15, 19), (16, 20), (17, 21), (7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19 ) 18∼32 0∼6, 8∼13
i5-3230M
No.3
Ivy Bridge
DDR3, 4GiB 1, 1, 2, 8 (13, 17), (14, 18), (15, 19), (16, 20) 17∼31 0∼12
i5-3230M
No.4
Haswell
DDR3, 4GiB 1, 1, 1, 8 (13, 16), (14, 17), (15, 18) 16∼31 0∼12
i5-4210U
No.5
Haswell
DDR3, 16GiB 2, 1, 2, 8 (14, 18), (15, 19), (16, 20), (17, 21), (7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19 ) 18∼32 0∼6, 8∼13
i7-4790
No.6
Skylake
DDR4, 16GiB 2, 1, 2, 16 (7, 14), (15, 19), (16, 20), (17, 21), (18, 22), (8, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19) 19∼33 0∼7, 9∼13
i5-6600
No.7
Skylake
DDR4, 4GiB 1, 1, 1, 8 (6, 13), (14, 16), (15, 17) 16∼31 0∼12
i5-6200U
No.8
Coffee Lake
DDR4, 8GiB 1, 1, 1, 16 (6 13), (14 17), (15 18), (16, 19) 17∼32 0∼12
i5-9400
No.9
Coffe Lake
DDR4, 16GiB 2, 1, 2, 16 (7, 14), (15, 19), (16, 20), (17, 21), (18, 22), (8, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19) 19∼33 0∼7, 9∼13
i5-9400
TABLE II: Reverse-Engineered DRAM Mappings on 9 different machine settings. (The Config. column presents a specific
DRAM configuration in a quadruple: (channel (#), DIMMs (#) per channel, ranks (#) per DIMM, banks (#) per rank).)
E. Row & Column Bit Detection (Fine-Grained)
As discussed in section III-C, we need to determine the
row bits and column bits that are also bank bits. From the
Specifications in Section III-A, we can know the exact number
of row and column bits for a specific DRAM chip, and since
we have detected some row bits and column bits, we are able
to determine how many row bits and column bits left to be
uncovered.
For the remaining covered row bits, we start to investigate
the bank address functions that consist of two bits. We select
two physical address with only those two bits different and
measure their latency. The two addresses actually map to the
same bank. If the latency is actually high, it means either one
bit is a row bit. We consider the higher one as the row bits as
discussed in [12], [14]. If there are also row bits still covered
after investigating two-bit address functions, we proceed to
investigate address the bank functions that have more bits. In
practice, we have not seen any case that needs to investigate
the address functions that have three or more bits.
For the remaining covered column bits, we first check the
number of remaining column bits that need uncovered, and
then identify those bits that have not been identified as column
bits in coarse-grained detection, denoted as C. Next, according
to the Empirical Observation in Section III-A, we know the
lowest bit (denoted as l) of the function occupying the most
number of bits is not a column bit. So we investigate the bits
{C − l}, by the order from low to high, and consider the first
requested number of bits as column bits.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we first present DRAM address mappings
uncovered by DRAMDig, and then evaluate its performance
overhead. At last, we utilize the uncovered mappings on 3
machines to perform double-sided rowhammer tests.
A. Uncovered DRAM Address Mappings
We test DRAMDig on multiple Linux systems with different
combinations of Intel microarchitectures and DRAM chips
including DDR3 and DDR4. DRAMDig has successfully un-
covered DRAM mappings including row and column bits and
bank address functions for all the test settings, as shown in
Table II. From the table, we see that DRAMDig has uncov-
ered DRAM address mappings not only for mainstream CPU
microarchitectures but also for a much newer CPU architecture
(i.e., Coffee Lake) that previous works have never discussed.
Distinguish DRAMDig: When executing the code that Xiao
el al. [14] shared with us, we found that it could not work on
more than half of the machine settings, that is, No.2 and No.6-
9. Take the No. 6 machine setting as an instance, the running
code was stuck after resolving (16, 20), (17, 21), (18, 22) as
3 of 6 bank address functions. As such, their approach is not
generic. For DRAMA [10], we ran their code for numerous
times and found that it generated different DRAM mappings
most of the time. As DRAMA is the first generic reverse-
engineering tool, we further compare DRAMDig with it in
terms of performance overhead and rowhammer tests in the
following sections.
B. Performance Overhead
We present the performance overhead required by
DRAMDig and DRAMA [10] respectively. As shown in Fig. 2,
DRAMDig can be finished from 69 seconds to 17 minutes
in all machines settings (only 7.8 minutes on average). In
comparison, DRAMA spent from almost 500 seconds to 2
hours, indicating a much higher time cost than DRAMDig.
Particularly in No.3 and No.7 settings, it cost roughly two
hours without producing any results before we killed it.
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Fig. 2: Time costs for DRAMDig and DRAMA to uncover
DRAM mappings on 9 machine settings. Clearly, DRAMDig
requires much less time than DRAMA on average.
For DRAMDig, most of the time cost comes from the
physical address partition, which is heavily affected by the
number of selected physical addresses. The more selected
addresses require more access latency measurements and thus
the partition costs more time. Specifically, DRAMDig in No.6
and No.9 settings selected the highest number of physical
addresses (almost 16,000), making itself timing-consuming.
In contrast, it selected the least number (about 4000) in No.8
setting, thus making itself time-saving.
C. Rowhammer Tests
A correct DRAM address mapping is critical in effectively
inducing rowhammer bit flips and thus can justify the cor-
rectness of uncovered DRAM address mappings. Since both
Seaborn’s [13] and Xiao’s [14] tools are not generic and
limited to one or multiple machine settings, we compare our
work with another generic tool, DRAMA [10].
Specifically, we conducted double-sided rowhammer tests
using the DRAM address mappings uncovered by DRAMDig
and DRAMA respectively on three machine settings. For each
setting, we performed 5 rowhammer tests and each lasted 5
minutes. The results are induced bit flips as shown in Table III.
T1-T5 represent the 5 tests while the bit-flip numbers of each
test are displayed in a way of DRAMDig/DRAMA. From
the Total column, we can clearly see that DRAMDig caused
significantly more bit flips than DRAMA while DRAMA even
failed to induce any bit flips in some tests on No.2 and No.5.
Also, the rowhammer test results justify the correctness of our
uncovered DRAM address mappings.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a generic knowledge-assisted
tool, DRAMDig, which applied domain knowledge to effi-
ciently and deterministically reverse-engineer DRAM address
mappings. We evaluated DRAMDig on a bunch of machines
with different DRAM chips and CPU microarchitectures set-
tings. The experiments showed that DRAMDig was able to
deterministically uncover DRAM address mappings on all the
Machine T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 Total
No. DRAMDig/DRAMA
No.1 296/197 418/179 226/177 627/259 484/286 2051/1098
No.2 959/240 934/0 976/18 1039/947 955/670 4863/1875
No.5 12/7 12/0 12/0 10/0 11/0 57/7
TABLE III: Both DRAMDig and DRAMA perform 5 tests on
three machine settings and each test lasts 5 minutes. Clearly,
DRAMDig has induced significantly more bit flips.
test machines with only 69 seconds in the best case and
17 minutes in the worst case. We also performed double-
sided rowhammer tests with our uncovered DRAM address
mappings and made comparison with DRAMA, and the results
indicated that DRAMDig could induce significantly more bit
flips, which justified the correctness of our tool. As a result,
we are going to open-source our tool to help users better
understand DRAM address mapping and evaluate the impact
of rowhammer attacks and rowhammer DRAM PUFs.
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